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Balancing the Equities: Is Missouri
Adopting a Progressive Rule for
Relocation of Easements?
Umphres v. JR. Mayer Enterprises, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri law of easements might not be the place one would expect
to find a progressive development of the law. Half a century ago, the rules
regarding a servient tenement holder's relocation of an easement appeared well
settled.' Neither the easement holder nor the owner of the servient land could
unilaterally relocate the easement Over the past four decades, however,
some courts have begun to shake up Missouri's approach to relocation of
easements, while still paying lip service to the old rules.4 Umphres v. JR.
Mayer Enterprises, Inc. reflects the impact of these changes on the rule
regarding a servient tenement holder's right to relocate an easement.
Although Missouri courts have neither openly nor uniformly recognized the
new approach,5 it nonetheless guides some courts' decisions. With a few
distinctions, Missouri courts have experimented with what amounts to adoption
of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property's progressive stance.' An
examination of Umphres reveals this modem approach to a servient estate
holder's right to relocate an easement, and may provide a glimpse of things
to come in Missouri easement law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Sam and Nora Umphres commenced this case as an action in equity on
November 4, 1987. They sought a temporary restraining order to prevent
1. 889 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
2. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Note, The Right of
Owners of Servient Estates to Relocate Easements, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1697
(1996) [hereinafter The Right of Owners].
5. Umphres, in fact, recites the old rule as to relocation of easements, but follows
the new rule by affirming the remedy granted by the trial court. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d
at 90. See infra note 131-33 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 122-34.
7. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 89.
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J. Randall Mayer, president of J.R. Mayer Enterprises,' from moving a
roadway that they used to access their property,9 and they sought a
reformation of the deed of their predecessors in title.'
This case really began on September 9, 1948, when the Umphres'
predecessors in title, John A. and Alma J. Keller, purchased five acres in
western St. Louis County from Albert and Ida Jacobs." On August 16,
1950, the Umphres acquired this interest from the Kellers.Y The Kellers'
original deed from the Jacobs described an "easement," ten feet wide, running
north and south along the eastern line of their land. 3 The Jacobs, however,
had no property interest in the land that the easement traversed. 4 The land
affected by the "easement" was actually owned by Arthur and Hilda Ray, the
predecessors in title of J. R. Mayer Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter Mayer). 5
The Jacobs likewise had no property interest in this "easement" that could
subsequently have been conveyed to either the Kellers or the Umphres, and
there was no evidence that any roadway was ever located within the bounds
of the "easement" described in the deed.' 6 Since approximately 1950, a
gravel road existed just east of this "easement" described in the 1948 deed, 7
and the Umphres used this road continuously to access their property until
1987 when they commenced this action.' The court concluded that the 1948
deed must have referred to this road, but misdescribed its location.'
Mayer built homes on the property it acquired from the Rays as a part of
a subdivision development. 0 Both the existing roadway and the "easement"
in the 1948 deed ran across lots 52, 53, and 54 of the property.2' These lots
belonged to Mr. and Mrs. Greco, Mr. and Mrs. Hairisine, and Mr. and Mrs.
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Cook, respectively, at the time of the court's opinion.22 Some time in mid-
1987, J. Randall Mayer approached the Umphres to request their consent to
move the roadway to the west, closer to the property line, but the Umphres
refused.' As a result, Mayer's attorney sent the Umphres a letter dated
November 2, 1987, informing them that the roadway would be moved despite
their objection on November 6, 1987.24
The Circuit Court of St. Louis County denied the Umphres' request for
a temporary restraining order, and Mayer moved the roadway as planned on
November 6.' The newly constructed road lay approximately within the
boundaries of the 1948 "easement., 26 The owners of the lots thereafter
erected fences, hedges, gardens, and swing sets over the location of the old
roadway.27
The trial court found that the Umphres had a valid easement by
prescription over the old roadway and that the removal of that roadway
constituted an abridgement of their legal rights.2' The judge, however, found
that the Umphres' legal injuries were compensable and awarded damages of
$7,500 in lieu of the requested injunction. 9
The Umphres appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in denying
injunctive relief, given the willful encroachment by Mayer.3" Mayer cross-
appealed, and argued that the trial court erred in finding that the Umphres had
an easement by prescription over the old roadway location.3'
The Eastern District Court of Appeals, Division Two, held that the
Umphres' use of the roadway was open, adverse, visible, continuous and
uninterrupted under a claim of right for ten years and thus constituted a valid
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 88-89.




29. Id For the significance of this remedy, see infra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text.
30. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 89.
31. Id Mayer maintained that any use of the old roadway by the Umphres had
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easement by prescription.32 The Court also held that, given all equitable
considerations, the denial of the permanent injunction and the award of
damages were proper, allowing the easement to remain as relocated by
Mayer.33 The court affirmed the $7,500 damage award to enable the
Umphres to repair minor construction defects so that the new road would be
of equal quality with the old road.34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A: Missouri's Historical Approach
to Relocation of Easements
The law regarding relocation of easements in Missouri is highly
specialized, with few cases directly addressing the relocation issue raised in
Umphres. As such, the courts frequently must rely upon more general rules
of easements to govem these cases. In the relocation of easements area, the
courts look to the rules regarding interference with easements by servient land
holders to guide their decisions.35 In light of this, the rules regarding
interference with easements, including alteration and obstruction, must be
discussed along with the few cases that deal directly with relocation questions.
Since the nineteenth century, Missouri has followed the traditional rule
limiting the rights of a servient tenement holder to interfere with an easement
across the servient estate.36 In Missouri, a servient estate holder generally
32. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 89-90. For a general discussion of easements by
prescription, see Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson Partnership, 851 S.W.2d 504 (Mo.
1993), appeal after remand, 916 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Hermann v.
Lynnbrook Land Co., 806 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
33. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 91.
34. Id. at 90. This rationale suggests that the court had something like the
modem rule in mind. See infra notes 130-31.
35. Relocation is really one variety of interference with an easement. Thus,
interference cases are of value to the courts in formulating the rules for relocation. See
Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enterprises, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). The
Umphres case, for example, relies heavily on cases that do not deal directly with
relocation questions. See, e.g., Hubert v. Magidson, 243 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Mo. 1951);
RFS, Inc. v. Cohen, 772 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Hanna v. Nowell, 330
S.W.2d 595, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
36. See, e.g., Cook v. Ferbert, 46 S.W. 947 (Mo. 1898); Downing v. Dinwiddie,
33 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1895). The traditional rule is that-absent statutory authorization
or mutual consent-an easement, once established, may not be unilaterally relocated
by either party. This holds true even though the easement is detrimental to or
decreases the efficient use of the servient estate. 28A C.J.S. Easements § 157 (1996).
1042 [Vol. 61
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cannot alter the route of a right of way across his or her land without the
consent of the easement holder.37 The Missouri Supreme Court outlined this
rule in 1964 in Bladdick v. Ozark Ore Company.38 As the facts of Bladdick
closely parallel those in Umphres, a short discussion is informative.
In Bladdick, in order to make use of the mineral resources lying below
the surface of a roadway, the defendant excavated a portion of the land over
which the plaintiffs held an easement.39 The defendant stripped away the
surface, rendering the existing roadway impassible." Before destroying the
old road, the defendant relocated the easement and constructed a new portion
of road to reroute around the excavation.4' As in Umphres, the new roadway
was not of equal quality with the one destroyed by the servient land holder.42
The defendant corporation maintained that it could relocate the easement as
it saw fit so long as there was no interference with the plaintiffs' general right
of ingress and egress.43 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, did not agree.
After commenting on the specific granting language of the easement in
question,' the court set out a general statement of the law:
These rules should apply equally whether the easement is acquired by grant,
implication, or prescription. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF
EASEMENTS AND LICENSES iN LAND § 7.03[1][a] (1988). But see F.M. English,
Annotation, Relocation of Easements (other than those arising by necessity); rights as
between private parties, 80 A.L.R.2d 743 (1995) (maintaining that easements not
acquired by prescription are more in the nature of contracts, and thus must remain
subject to mutual consent). The policy arguments favoring the new rule apply equally
whether the easement is one by grant, implication, or prescription. See infra text
accompanying notes 135-62.
For a discussion of how other jurisdictions address the relocation problem, see
English, Annotation, supra. It should be noted that often, as in Missouri, jurisdictions
will follow the old or new rule in different factual situations. For a jurisdictional
break down of the case law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES)
§ 4.8 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1994) and English, Annotation, supra.
37. See, e.g., Bladdick v. Ozark Ore Co., 381 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1964). This
is the traditional rule followed by most states. See supra note 36.
38. Bladdick, 381 S.W.2d at 766. While Bladdick sets out the rule as to
relocation, it, like Umphres, is a case involving a damage award instead of injunctive
relief to restore the easement in question. For an explanation of the impact of this
distinction, see infra text accompanying note 131.
39. Bladdick, 381 S.W.2d at 762.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 763.
42. Id
43. Id. at 766.
44. The court noted that nothing in the written grant of this easement reserved in
the defendant any right to locate or relocate the road. Rather, the court stated that the
1996] 1043
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As a general rule, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, the location of
an easement cannot be changed by either party without the other's consent,
after it has been once established either by the express terms of the grant
or by the acts of the parties, except under the authority of an express or
implied grant or reservation to this effect.
45
The court commented that this rule applies even if the new route is equal in
utility and quality to the original way.46
In an earlier case, the Western District Court of Appeals employed
similar reasoning when it stated that a servient land holder could not compel
an easement holder to seek a new location for the easement by encroaching
on the old location.47 In Kansas City Power & Light Company v. Riss, the
servient land owner wished to increase the size of a lake on his property. The
power company claimed that the expanded lake impinged upon its easement
by covering the area over which several of its poles ran. 8 The court, in
rather stem language, stated that the easement holder had a vested interest in
the location of its easement, and that the servient land holder could not make
improvements to his land that would force the relocation of the easement.4 9
To prevent this relocation, the court upheld the judgment that an injunction
should issue to restrain the interference and restore the easement to its former
location and status." It is noteworthy that, as in Umphres, the servient land
holder made the proposed improvements with knowledge of the easement
holder's disagreement."
grant called for a right of way over the "established roadway." Id. As to a
prescriptive easement, the location is initially determined by the character of the
prescriptive use. Cf Curran v. Bowen, 753 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (no
greater or different use may be made of a prescriptive easement than that under which
it was gained).
45. Bladdick, 381 S.W.2d at 766 (quoting 28A C.J.S. Easements § 84 (1996)
(current citation); 17A Am. Jur. Easements, §§ 103, 134 (1957)).
46. Id.
47. K.C.P.& L. Co. v. Riss, 319 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
48. Id. at 263.
49. Id. at 264.
50. Id. at 265.
51. Id. In Umphres, the fact that Mayer proceeded in the face of disagreement
did not justify injunctive relief. In this case, however, such a willful act resulted in
the issuance of an injunction. For a resolution of this apparent conflict, see infra notes
124-27 and accompanying text.
1044 [Vol. 61
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B. The Traditional Remedy for
Interference With an Easement2
When a servient tenement holder interferes with an easement, as by
relocation, Missouri courts have traditionally granted injunctive relief5 3 This
rule governed, whether the servient tenement holder altered the location of the
easement completely or merely obstructed the use of an existing easement. 4
For later reference, 5 it should be noted that courts following the
traditional rule on relocation of easements make no mention of balancing the
equities in determining whether an injunction should issue. 6 The balancing
of the equities doctrine tends to show up only in cases adopting the modem
approach to relocation.57 When employing the traditional rule, Missouri
124-27 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of how the selection and evaluation of remedy in relocation
cases is the key to understanding which rule is being applied by the court, see infra
note 131 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Patterson v. Wilmont, 245 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. 1952); Robins v.
Wright, 53 S.W.2d 1046 (Mo. 1932); Cook v. Ferbert, 46 S.W. 947 (Mo. 1898);
Downing v. Dinwiddie, 33 S.W. 470 (Mo. 1895); Denning v. Manley, 610 S.W.2d 51
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980); M.H. Siegfried Real Estate v. Renfrow, 592 S.W.2d 488 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979); Moschale v. Mock, 591 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Kelly v.
Schmelz, 439 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); K.C.P.& L. Co. v. Riss, 319 S.W.2d
262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Winslow v. Sauerwein, 285 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
54. See Bladdick v. Ozark Ore Co., 381 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1964); K.C.P.& L. Co.
v. Riss, 319 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
55. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
56. See Patterson v. Wilmont, 245 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. 1952); Robins v. Wright, 53
S.W.2d 1046 (Mo. 1932); Cook v. Ferbert, 46 S.W. 947 (Mo. 1898); Downing v.
Dinwiddie, 33 S.W. 470 (Mo. 1895); Denning v. Manley, 610 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); M.H. Siegfried Real Estate v. Renfrow, 592 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); Moschale v. Mock, 591 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. Ct. App 1979); Kelly v. Schmelz,
439 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); K.C.P.& L. v. Riss, 319 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1958); Winslow v. Sauerwein, 285 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). None of
these cases balance the benefit to the easement holder against the hardship on the
servient land holder before stating that injunction would be the proper remedy. But
see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text for a group of Missouri cases that take
the opposite view.
57. See infra note 66-75 and accompanying text. This could be a reflection of
the fact that, in cases where an injunction does not issue, the relocation has been
otherwise reasonable and in conformity with the modem doctrine. The reasonableness
analysis of the modem approach could be roughly characterized as "balancing the
equities." Perhaps the modem approach will be followed only in those cases where
the relocation has been reasonable, and in those cases where the relocation is
unreasonable, the balance of the equities language will not appear and the courts will
1996] 1045
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courts of equity jealously protected easements as early as 1895.58 In that
year the Missouri Supreme Court stated, "The right to use a passageway...
is a species of property, the interference of which is very difficult, if not
impossible, to adequately compensate with pecuniary damages." 9 In 1898
the court made an even stronger statement, saying that any interference with
an easement that amounted to only a mere decrease in benefit or convenience
could not be adequately remedied with damages and that an injunction should
issue.60 That rule remained largely unchanged throughout the last hundred
years.6 Several cases following this view speak of injunctive relief in such
strong terms that it almost seems to be a matter of right for the easement
holder. 2
resort to the old rule. See infra text accompanying notes 163-72.
58. See, e.g., Downing v. Dinwiddie, 33 S.W. 470 (Mo. 1895).
59. Id. at 472.
60. Cook v. Ferbert, 46 S.W. 947, 948 (Mo. 1898).
61. See Kelly v. Schmelz, 439 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Winslow
v. Sauerwein, 285 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). The Winslow court set out the
three part test for determining when an injunction should issue in easement cases:
The principle is also rather uniformly accepted that injunction is a proper
remedy for an interference with a right of way whenever the injury
complained of is irreparable, the interference is of a permanent and
continuous character, or the remedy at law by an action for damages will
not afford adequate relief.
Id. at 25. The court went on to recognize Missouri's long established rule that
injunctions were proper remedies to restrain interference with an easement. Id. See,
e.g., Moschale v. Mock, 591 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); K.C.P.& L. Co.
v. Riss, 319 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
Many of these cases cited Mo. REv. STAT. § 526.030 as authority for this
proposition. This statute, first enacted in 1909, provides currently:
The remedy by writ of injunction or prohibition shall exist in all cases
where a cloud would be put on the title of real estate being sold under an
execution against a person, partnership, or corporation having no interest in
such real estate subject to execution at the time of sale, or an irreparable
injury to real or personal property is threatened, and to prevent the doing
of any legal wrong whatever, whenever in the opinion of the court an
adequate remedy cannot be afforded by an action for damages.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 526.030 (1994).
But see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of how this rule
is sometimes abandoned in favor of the balance of the equities approach.
62. See Downing v. Dinwiddie, 33 S.W. 470, 472 (Mo. 1895) (noting that it is
almost impossible to compensate such a violation with pecuniary damages); Denning
v. Manley 610 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that the trial court was
obligated to issue an injunction requiring the removal of obstructions from a right of
way); M.H. Siegfried Real Estate v. Renfrow, 592 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo. Ct. App.
1046 [Vol. 61
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In one case typical of this area the court stated that when an easement
holder expressed a desire to continue use of an easement for ingress and
egress, the servient land holder's interference with the roadway meant that an
injunction was "not only proper but necessary if [easement holders] are to be
afforded beneficial relief."'63  In another case in which permanent
improvements had been constructed over the path of the easement, the court
held that the trial court was obligated to order the removal of the obstacles
and to enjoin any future violations.'
C. Missouri's Experimentation With Balancing
the Equities in Easement Interference Cases
A handful of notable Missouri cases have strayed from the rigid
traditional rule that any interference with an easement will be restrained no
matter what the hardship on the servient land holder.6" In these cases courts
continue to speak of interference with an easement as a legal wrong, but after
balancing the equities,66 deny the traditional injunctive relief and instead
relegate the easement holder to an action for damages.67 Other cases that do
not directly address the balance of the equities doctrine confirm that Missouri
may be at least sympathetic to the idea that servient landholders should be
able to maximize the efficient use of their land. 8 As previously noted, while
1969) (finding that obstructions of a private roadway by cables and posts were
wrongful acts that ought to be enjoined); Kelly v. Schmelz, 439 S.W.2d 211, 214
(interference with an easement entitled the easement holder to injunctive relief);
K.C.P.&L. Co. v. Riss, 319 S.W.2d 262, 264-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (explaining that
a suit for damages could not fully protect the easement holder from the servient land
holder's attempts to force relocation of the easement by encroachment and injunction
should issue); Winslow v. Sauerwein, 285 S.W.2d 21, 25-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955)
(finding an injunction not only proper but necessary to protect the easement holder
from interference).
63. Winslow v. Sauerwein, 285 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
64. Denning v. Manley, 610 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
65. See infra note 66-75 and accompanying text.
66. For a general discussion of balancing the equities and hardships in injunction
cases, see 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION
§ 2.9(2) (2d ed. 1993).
67. See, e.g., Hubert v. Magidson, 243 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Mo. 1951), Hanna v.
Nowell, 330 S.W.2d 595, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). As has been noted, the choice of
remedy in these cases really determines the degree of protection to be afforded the
easement holder, and hence, the rule that is actually being followed by the court in its
analysis.
68. Cf Fenster v. Hyken, 759 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
an injunction that restrained interference, exceptthat interference which was reasonably
10471996]
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many of these cases do not deal specifically with relocation questions, 9 they
set forth the doctrines that have served as the foundation upon which the
courts have fashioned the relocation rules. In fact, in its decision, the
Umphres court cited Hubert v. Magidson, one of the notable balance of the
equities/easement opinions.70
Like Umphres, Hubert involved interference with an easement for a right
of way across the servient land.7' The defendant corporation erected
permanent improvements that the court recognized as encroachments upon the
boundaries of the easement in question.72 The court, however, strayed from
the stem language of earlier opinions and refused to order removal of the
obstructions.73 The court stated that it had to consider "the relative benefits
to the plaintiff as against the injury to the defendants," and that equity will not
grant injunctive relief for injuries that are "small or technical."'74 In refusing
to protect the easement, the court departed from the strong position of
Cookh 5-that a mere decrease in convenience should warrant injunction-and
took an important first step toward changing Missouri's approach to easement
cases.
D. The Proposed Restatement (Third)
of Property (Servitudes) Approach
On April 5, 1989, the American Law Institute issued Tentative Draft
Number Four of the Restatement of the Law (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
necessary to maintain existing facilities); Beiser v. Hensic, 655 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the owner of a servient estate has the right of full
dominion and use so long as he or she does not substantially interfere with the
reasonable use of the easement).
See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing the efficient use of
servient land as one possible policy justification for the modem approach to relocation
of easements by servient landholders).
69. For a discussion of how general easement rules affect the specific area of
relocation of easements by servient land holders, see supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
70. Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enterprises, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
71. Hubert v. Magidson, 243 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo. 1951).
72. Id. at 339-41.
73. Id. at 343. For cases which more strictly enforced the old rule, see supra
notes 36-64.
74. Hubert, 243 S.W.2d at 343-44.
75. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
1048 [Vol. 61
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dealing with the Interpretation of Servitudes.76 Section 4.8 covers location
and dimension of servitudes." It provides:
Except where application of the rules stated in section 4.1" leads to
a different result, the location and dimension of a servitude are determined
as follows:
(1) The owner of the servient estate has the right to specify the
location of an easement, profit, or other servitude that requires location, but
the location must be reasonably suited for the intended purpose and be
designated within a reasonable time.
(2) The dimensions of a servitude are those reasonably necessary for the
enjoyment of the servitude for its intended purpose.
(3) The holder of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes
in the location or dimensions of an easement when necessary to permit normal
use or development of the servient estate if the changes
(a) do not significantly lessen the utility of the servitude, or
(b) increase the burdens on the holder of the servitude benefit, or
(c) frustrate the purpose for which the servitude was created, and
(d) the holder of the servient estate bears the expenses of making the
changes.79
The comments to subsection three indicate that this rule should apply
only to affirmative easements and not to negative easements or affirmative
covenants.8"
Illustration Four of this section outlines a factual situation very similar
to Umphres.8 ' In that example, a roadway giving access to Whiteacre runs
across Blackacre within ten feet of a house located on Blackacre. "2 The
owner of Blackacre, 0, wishes to relocate the road along the boundary of the
property to reduce traffic near the house and to increase the usability of the
remainder of the property. 3 Under the rule stated, 0 would be entitled to
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1994).
77. Id.
78. Section 4.1 sets forth general rules of construction in interpreting servitudes.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVTUDES) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1994).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. This makes perfect sense because negative easements and restrictive
covenants generally have no tangible location on the servient land.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 cmt. f, illus. 4
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relocate the easement to the new location so long as 0 bears the expense.84
The similarity to the result in Umphres is striking.85
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Umphres v. JR. Mayer Enterprises, Inc., the Eastem District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals first addressed Mayer's cross appeal on the validity
of the Umphres' prescriptive easement across the lots in question.86 The
court then set out Missouri's requirements to obtain a valid easement by
prescription." To obtain such an easement, the claimant must show that the
use of the property has been "open, adverse, visible, continuous and
uninterrupted under a claim of right for ten years or more."88 The court
affirmed that the Umphres met these requirements by reason of their use
between 1950 and 1987.89 According to the court, it was of no consequence
that the land used as a roadway did not fall exactly within the description of
the 1948 deed.9" A visible, actual use was enough to put the owner of the
servient estate on notice.9' The court also noted that the Umphres' use of the
strip was under a claim of right due to the 1948 deed that attempted to grant
an easement in the same vicinity.92 As to the adversity requirement, the
court noted that an intention to violate the rights of the owner of the servient
estate is not required, but rather use without regard to any right of the owner
to prohibit the use suffices.93 Noting that the Umphres' used the roadway
in question for several decades without any regard for respondent's right, the
court found that the use was adverse.94 As to Mayer's claim that the use had
84. Id.
85. It should be noted that the Restatement selection of remedies in the event of
unreasonable relocation favors injunction and, thus, diverges from the panoply of
remedies available in Missouri courts. See infra text accompanying notes 163-72.
86. Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enterprises, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 89. (Judge
Pudlowski wrote for Division Two of the Court, with Smith, P.J., and White, J.,
concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Hermann v. Lynnbrook Land Co., 806 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991)).
89. Id.
90. Id. Since the Umphres claimed the strip by prescription, the description of
the roadway did not matter. Had they claimed an easement by grant, this location
would have been relevant.
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been permissive and could not ripen into a prescriptive easement,95 the court
found no evidence of permissive use due to the attempted grant in the 1948
deed.96 First, the alleged permission came from the previous owner of the
dominant estate through the 1948 deed.97 As stated above, the dominant land
owners had no property rights in the land in question, and, hence, could grant
no valid permission for its use. Second, the court found no evidence that the
purported easement granted in 1948 was permissive.98 As such, the court
held that the Umphres acquired a valid easement over the old roadway by
prescription."
Moving on to the remedy granted by the trial court, the court outlined the
law on relocation of easements." 0 The court first recognized that movement
of the roadway constituted a legal wrong against the Umphres.'' The court
then recited the historical rule that the boundaries of an easement defined by
use cannot be changed absent the consent of all parties."0 2 Since a
prescriptive easement is defined completely by use,0 3 the court concluded
that the boundaries of a prescriptive easement may not be altered without the
consent of all parties.' 4 The court noted the undisputed fact that the old
roadway had been blocked with fences and hedges, altered in shape, and
moved several feet to the west without the Umphres' consent.'05
95. Id at 89-90. The respondent cited Johnston v. Bates, 778 S.W.2d 357, 362
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) for this rule, and Homan v. Hutchison, 817 S.W.2d 944, 948
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) for the rule that the presumption of adversity does not apply
when there is evidence of prior permission.
96. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90.
97. Id The court noted the obvious but essential distinction that permission, for
purposes of defeating adversity, can only be granted by an owner of servient land. Id.
98. Id. The court noted that the easement was equally likely to have been
bargained for, prescriptive, or even a fabrication by the seller. Id. In addition, since
the easement fell outside the land described in the 1948 deed, its language would not
grant permission to use the roadway.
99. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id (quoting Bladdick v. Ozark Ore Co., 381 S.W.2d 760, 765-66 (Mo.
1964)). For a discussion of the importance of the Bladdick decision, see supra notes
38-46 and accompanying text.
103. Umphres,889 S.W.2d at 90 (quoting Curran v. Bowan, 753 S.W.2d 940,943
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
104. Id. But see infra note 131 and accompanying text (noting that the remedy
allowed by the court makes this a hollow rule and, in effect, allows servient tenement
holders to relocate the easement as they wish, provided that the relocation is reasonable
and they are willing to bear the cost of the relocation).
105. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90. By recognizing this as a legal wrong but
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The court then addressed the Umphres' request for injunctive relief-the
issue central to the evolution of Missouri's rule of relocation. The court
upheld the trial court's determination that equitable relief was inappropriate
to the Umphres' case. 6 Following the modem break with prior case
law, 7 the court noted that equitable relief is "discretionary, extraordinary,
and should not be applied when an adequate legal remedy exists,"'03 or "the
injury is small."'" The court explained that, in making these
determinations, Missouri courts will balance the benefits to the party seeking
the injunction against the burdens to the other parties," 0 and also will
consider the willfulness of the parties' wrongful actions."' The court noted
that the injury to the Umphres appeared to be small," 2 and that the $7,500
damage award would either compensate them or leave them with the resources
to repair the new roadway." 3
In regard to the costs to the respondents, the court found a substantial
burden. The court noted that, should an injunction to restore the old roadway
issue, the respondents now living on the lots in question would have to
remove improvements and lose large portions of their yards." 4 Even so, the
court agreed with the Umphres that much of this hardship was self-imposed
due to the fact that the roadway was moved and the improvements made while
the instant case was pending."5  While agreeing that intentional acts
failing to award injunctive relief, the court is showing its abandonment of the old rule
that interference with easements by a servient land holder will not be tolerated. Since
the relative utility of the easement remained the same, the court adopted the modem
rule. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
108. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90 (quoting Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 766 S.W.2d
80, 86 (Mo. 1989)).
109. Id. (quoting RFS, Inc. v. Cohen, 772 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
110. Id. (quoting Hubert v. Magidson, 243 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Mo. 1951)). For
a discussion of the importance of the Hubert decision in the development of Missouri's
approach to relocation of easements, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
111. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90 (quoting Hanna v. Nowell, 330 S.W.2d 595, 603
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959)).
112. Id. The court noted that nothing about the old roadway appeared to be
unique or valuable, and that the Umphres had not shown any diminution in the value
of their land due to the change in location.
113. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90. As an interesting aside, Missouri cases seem
fixated upon the $7,500 figure in easement cases. In addition to Umphres, Hubert and
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weighed against the defendants in the balance of the equities, H6 the court
refused to allow this one factor to control the outcome." 7 The court noted
that Mayer deliberately moved forward in the face of an injunction, but
nonetheless declined to reverse the denial of injunctive relief based upon this
defiance, believing Mayer's actions to be colorably legal under the 1948
deed."8 The court outlined several reasons for this refusal: the new road
more exactly conformed to the 1948 deed,"9 the new road was substantially
similar to the old road,"2 and the new road remained totally upon the
servient estate.'
V. COMMENT
A. Comparing Missouri's Rule to the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
When one compares Umphres with the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Property (Servitudes) rule on relocation of easements, the similarities are
striking. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of the Restatement require that the
change in location not: i) significantly lessen the utility of the servitude, ii)
increase the burden on the easement holder, or iii) frustrate the purpose of the
servitude."2 In some form, each of these considerations falls under
Umphres's rubric of "balancing the equities."'" Umphres, however, seems
to take the test further by also considering the amount of reliance expended
on the relocation by the servient land owner.'24 Apparently, this reliance
need not even be reasonable in nature, at least where the change in location
is not overly burdensome on the easement holder.'25 Umphres allowed
116. Id. at 91 (quoting Hanna, 330 S.W.2d at 603).
117. Id. The court thus refused to allow any one factor to tie the hands of
Missouri courts in balancing the equities.




122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVrrUDES) § 4.8 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1994).
123. In the Missouri cases relying upon balancing the equities, the courts have
spoken in terms of relative burdens which encompass these factors. See, e.g., Hanna
v. Nowell, 330 S.W.2d 595, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
124. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90.
125. In Umphres, the improvements were made in the face of pending litigation,
but the court did not characterize them as sufficiently unreasonable to justify an
injunction. Id. at 90.
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Mayer and the lot owners to get away with making improvements not only in
the face of opposition by the easement holder, but also with knowledge of
pending litigation and possible injunction. 26 At first glance, one must
assume that reliance expended by the servient land holder will perhaps
influence a Missouri court's decision. Closer scrutiny of the cases, however,
indicates that the discussion of reliance by courts faced with situations similar
to Umphres is likely a make-weight argument, and that what is really being
evaluated is the reasonableness of the relocation.'27
As to the requirement that the servient land owner bear the costs of
relocation,28 Umphres similarly falls into step with the proposed
Restatement. In Umphres the damages awarded were neither compensation for
the fact that a legal wrong had been committed nor to compensate the
Umphres for their lost property interest in the location of the old roadway, but
rather to allow them to make repairs to maintain and correct the new roadway
to make it of comparable quality with the old one.'29 Under the proposed
Restatement, such an action for damages would be the remedy for a servient
land owner that failed to bear the costs of a reasonable unilateral
relocation. 3
126. Even if they did not have actual knowledge, the current owners of the lots
in question should be charged with constructive knowledge of the dispute since the
Umphres filed suit immediately after the dispute, but before Mayer had sold the land
to them. The dispute would then have been a matter of public record.
127. In cases where an injunction issued under the traditional rule, the servient
land owner often expended significant reliance. See supra notes 53-54. Reliance,
then, must not be a pivotal issue. Viewed in light of the Restatement, the
reasonableness of the relocation is the real issue, and the remedy awarded will reveal
a court's determination of this issue. A reasonable relocation will not be enjoined, but
an unreasonable one will. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
If the deliberate acts of Mayer and the lot owners during the pendency of this
action were not unreasonable reliance, it is hard to imagine what would qualify as
unreasonable. Basing the holding of Umphres upon a reliance theory makes little
sense.
When compared with the language of Bladdick, which squarely refused to
consider either the utility or the quality of the new location, this reasoning shows a
marked departure from the old rule. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1994).
129. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90.
130. This remedy is implied by Illustration Four, allowing a reasonable relocation
so long as the servient land holder "bears all the expense" of the relocation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1994).
Presumably, if the servient land holder is responsible for bearing all expenses of a
reasonable relocation, the easement holder would be entitled to bring an action for
damages for any of the costs of the relocation that the servient land holder failed to
1054 [Vol. 61
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The selection of a remedy, then, reveals which approach the deciding
court is actually following. By refusing to award injunctive relief, Umphres
and comparable cases allow, in effect, servient land owners to relocate an
easement to any reasonable new location, provided that they pay for this
relocation. Missouri is caught up in a semantic limbo between the old
approach and the new-still labeling the act of relocation a "legal wrong"'3'
but then failing to correct that wrong. If changing the location truly is a legal
wrong, then the only solution to restore the status quo is to order a return to
the old location or to award damages for the injury to the easement holder's
property rights,1'3 not merely damages to provide a new easement of equal
quality to the old one. By balancing the equities, the courts are, without
saying so, determining whether the servient land holder acted reasonably, or,
at the very least, whether requiring a return to the status quo would be
unreasonable. 3 1
By this analysis, Missouri apparently is experimenting with a minority
approach that only a few other states have adopted. Kentucky, Maryland,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, Minnesota, Illinois, Virginia, and Florida,
for example, have all either allowed relocation when equitable considerations
required or refused to order a return to the original location when to do so
would be inequitable.'34 In the coming years, should Missouri choose to
stick with its new approach, the evolution of the relocation doctrine in these
states may be persuasive in refining Missouri's rule.
bear.
131. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 90.
132. For a discussion of the multifaceted nature of the property rights involved
in easement cases, see The Right of Owners, supra note 4, at 1705-08.
These types of property rights include both economic and intangible values (like
aesthetics or emotional attachment) to the parties involved. While some argue that the
new rule ignores the intangible side of property rights, these concerns can quite easily
be taken into account by courts in subparts (a) and (c) of the Restatement test. See
supra text accompanying note 79.
133. The difference between these two statements is subtle, but important. See
infra notes 163-72. Umphres is a case of the second variety, where the actions of the
servient land holder were not reasonable, but a return to the status quo would be even
more unreasonable.
134. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND
LIcENsES IN LAND § 7.03[1][d] (1988 and Supp. 1991).
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B. Is Change a Good Thing?: Weighing the Advantages
and Disadvantages of the Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Relocation of Easements
There are advantages and disadvantages to both the traditional rule and
the modem approach of the proposed Restatement.'35 Before finally
choosing between the two forms, Missouri courts should examine these
considerations.
The traditional rule's strengths lie in uniformity and fairness. Courts
universally recognized that an easement holder has no unilateral right to
relocate the servitude. Out of symmetry and fairness, courts have felt
obligated to find that the servient land holder not have this right either.'36
In addition, the traditional rule seems to comport with traditional notions of
property rights. Historically, property rights begin with an assumption of
absoluteness that may be tempered as needed to protect public policy
concerns.'37 Under such a regime, an economic analysis alone should not
allow interference based upon efficiency or other justification.'
Commentators have criticized the traditional rule, however, pointing out
that the reasons for denying the easement holder a right to relocate should not
135. For a commentary taking the opposite view of this Note on the wisdom of
the Restatement view, see The Right of Owners, supra note 4.
There is some debate regarding whether the same rules should apply to easements
by grant where the location has been agreed upon by the parties in the nature of a
contract. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Given the nature of the policy
arguments in support of the new rule, however, the origins of the easement should
make little difference. See infra text accompanying notes 136-62.
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 cmt. f(Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1994).
137. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971) ("A man's right in
his real property is of course not absolute.... [W]hile society will protect the owner
in his permissible interests in land, yet '. . . such an owner must expect to find the
absoluteness of his property rights curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion
of the best interests of others for whom these organs also operate as protective
agencies...."'); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV.
357, 362 (1954) ("Blackstone refers to property as the 'sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."').
138. This argument, however, breaks down when one considers the law by which
the Umphres attained their property rights. Since they in effect took a property right
from the owner of the servient estate by prescription-a doctrine that goes directly
against the idea of absolute property rights-the absolute property rights rule seems
unpersuasive in this context.
[Vol. 611056
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operate against a servient land holder's right to relocate an easement.'39
Essentially three main points support the rule that easement holders should not
be allowed to relocate. First, allowing an easement holder to relocate would
decrease the value of the servient estate by making it subject to the whim of
a third party. 4 ' Second, allowing an easement holder to relocate would
discourage improvement of the servient estate because the servient land holder
would be unable to rely upon the location of the easement. 4 ' Finally, such
a rule would invite conflict and litigation between the parties. 42 Of these,
only the last applies with the same force to a servient land owner's ability to
move an easement. 43 Granting the servient owner a limited right of
relocation, in fact, would actually increase the value and development of
servient land by making the easement a more flexible burden.'"
To its advantage, the modem rule offers the benefits of efficiency and
fairness. The flexibility of the modem rule increases the value and
development potential of the servient estate.'45 The requirement under the
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 cmt. f (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1994).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Cf The Right of Owners, supra note 4, at 1693 n.12 (Under the old rule,
each party clearly understands his rights with respect to the other party, making the
rule easy to administer).
143. This, however, may not be the case in practice. With this new rule, the
servient land holder now may bargain from a more equal position. Under the
traditional rule, the easement holder had no economic incentive to be reasonable.
Consent could be flatly denied, or an unreasonable price could be put on cooperation
since interference of any kind would be enjoined. Under the new rule, a servient land
holder can relocate without the consent of the easement holder, so the easement holder
has an incentive to be reasonable in order to retain at the very least some input in the
relocation, if not some remuneration. At the same time, the servient land holder must
likewise be reasonable in relocation, or face the possibility of the court reverting to the
traditional rule. Under this regime, it is entirely likely that the landowners will be
more willing to work out these problems outside the courtroom-the easement holder
due to the power of the servient estate owner to unilaterally relocate and the servient
estate holder due to the uncertainty of the reasonableness standard. See infra note 172
and accompanying text.
Some opponents also argue that community norms may be at work, overriding
economic and legal concerns. The difficulty with this argument, however, is its
assumption that these forces work in all, or even a majority, of easement relocation
cases. In most cases, these forces are either weak or absent. See, e.g., The Right of
Owners, supra note 4, at 1703-05.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 cmt. f(Tentative
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modem rule that utility of the easement not be diminished ensures that the
easement holder would not be adversely affected by a relocation.'4 6 From
a fairness standpoint, given that advances in technology or increases in use
may subject the servient estate to ever increasing burdens, it seems only fair
to allow the servient land holder to relocate the easement to a new and equally
useful location to avoid the unforeseen strains of such evolutions.'47
Opponents of the new approach, however, point to faults in the rule.
Arizona rejected the new rule, finding that a variable location of an easement
would tend only to incite litigation.'48 The court believed that although the
value of the servient estate might be increased, the value of the dominant land
would decrease correspondingly because of the uncertainty of location. 4 9
Citing similar reasons, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine added that the
rule would discourage reliance on the easement by the easement holder and
decrease improvement of the dominant estate.5 These arguments, however,
fail to recognize the limitations that the modem approach places upon
relocation. For a relocation to be proper, it must not adversely affect the
utility of the easement, increase the burden on the easement holder, or
otherwise frustrate the purpose of the easement.' So long as the relocation
meets these requirements, there should be no decrease in the value of the
easement or the dominant estate. Because the new approach assures the
easement holder of continued utility, the concerns regarding lack of
development are unfounded.
Opponents argue, however, that the rule would confer a windfall upon
servient land owners since the value of their land would increase due to the
flexibility of the new rule despite the fact that they purchased subject to a
fixed easement location.'52 Similar windfalls, however, occur in other areas
146. Id.
147. Id. This evolution could be either in form of use (horse traffic to cars, for
example) or in volume of traffic (should the dominant estate be subdivided or
developed, for example). See Lacy v. Schmitz, 639 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Mo. 1982); 28A
C.J.S. Easements § 176 (1996); Theodore H. Hellmuth, 18 MISSOURI PRACTICE § 313
(1985); Y.F. Chiang, Annotation, Extent of and Permissible Variations in, Use of
Prescriptive Easements of Way, 5 A.L.R.3d 439 (1995); Annotation, Scope of
Prescriptive Easement for Access (Easement of Way), 79 A.L.R.4th 604 (1995).
148. Stanis v. Johnson, 224 P.2d 201, 203 (Ariz. 1950), modified, 231 P.2d 956
(Ariz. 1951).
149. Id.
150. Davis v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 660, 665 (Me. 1980).
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8(3)(a-c) (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1994). In fact, it seems that when a servient land holder oversteps the
limitations of the new rule in selection of a new location, the harsh protections of the
old rule remain in force. See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8(3) cmt. f. See
1058 [Vol. 61
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of property law.' The presence of a windfall for a limited class of current
easement holders should not discourage a rule that otherwise increases overall
utility. Such an argument would prevent the progression of any rule of law
upon which parties had previously relied.
Finally, opponents argue that the old rule forces cooperation between
landowners.' On closer examination, howeVer, the new rule fosters more
cooperation between landowners. The problem of the recalcitrant easement
holder is dealt with by putting the power of unilateral relocation in the hands
of a previously powerless servient landholder. Thus, easement holders should
be willing to negotiate and retain some input into the relocation. Servient
estate owners, on the other hand, will be reluctant to wield their new found
power only to be faced with the uncertainty of what a court might determine
to be reasonable in their situation. Thus, a servient land owner would rather
procure permission before relocation and avoid the "reasonableness roulette"
that they would later face in court. 5
Courts have yet to address several other arguments that favor the
adoption of the Restatement approach. Under the old rule, certainty came at
the price of heavy burdens on the servient land owner. The traditional rule
treats the location of an easement as a property right, or entitlement.'56 In
a traditional relocation situation, the servient land holder's only option is to
approach the easement holder to purchase the "entitlement" (or right to
relocate). The easement holder is then in a position either to name an
also The Right of Owners, supra note 4, at 1695 (discussing how a windfall would be
conferred upon current servient estate holders by the adoption of a new rule).
153. One example occurs when changes in condition cause the extinguishment of
covenants. See 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 33 (1990); Theodore H. Hellmuth, 18 MIssouRJ
PRACTICE § 349 (1985).
154. The Right of Owners, supra note 4, at 1708-09.
155. Opponents of the new rule cite this uncertainty as a reason for avoiding the
new rule in favor of the old bright line standard. See The Right of Owners, supra note
4, at 1694. The opponents fail to grasp, however, that this uncertainty is an essential
ingredient in the new scheme. Contrary to their arguments, this uncertainty will
increase negotiation and should discourage actions by servient landholders that could
otherwise lead to litigation.
156. For an explanation of the entitlement concept, see Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
Under the entitlement (or property right) concept, a person wishing to remove
that entitlement must purchase it from its holder in a voluntary transaction. In a case
involving only two participants, a buyer and a seller, market value principles break
down and a bilateral monopoly takes hold. In such a situation, the seller has no other
market, but neither does the buyer. Thus, the seller may name a prohibitively high
price, and the buyer must accept that price or abstain from any action at all.
1996] 1059
21
Harris: Harris: Balancing the Equities:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
unreasonably high price or to arbitrarily refuse, regardless of the
reasonableness of the request or the increase in total efficiency that the
transaction would create. Thus, a bilateral monopoly is created.'57 Should
an easement become burdensome, the servient land holder has no remedy
against a recalcitrant easement holder since the traditional rule strictly forbids
unilateral relocation.
The Restatement rule, on the other hand, grants the servient land holder
a right to reasonable relocations. The benefits of this approach are twofold.
First, the bilateral monopoly of the traditional approach is broken. The right
of the servient land holder to relocate unilaterally reintroduces market forces
into negotiations. Easement holders have an incentive to be reasonable in
consenting to relocations since servient land holders may simply break off
negotiations and relocate unilaterally.'58 Second, the rule, while allowing
relocation, nevertheless encourages servient land holders to seek permission
first.'59 Reasonableness is a judicial determination made after the fact.
Should a court find the servient land holder's relocation unreasonable, the
servient land holder faces the easement holder's remedies. 6 As such, the
safest course of action for the servient land holder is to negotiate in advance
to prevent a judicial determination of reasonableness that will bring the
remedial measures to bear.' Thus, the modem rule will encourage
voluntary negotiations and fairness between the parties. Although this rule
imposes upon the easement holder the burden and risk of bringing suit against
an unreasonable relocation, it far surpasses in utility and fairness the
traditional rule that left the servient land owner remediless against an
unreasonable easement holder. The Restatement rule takes the huge burden
placed on the servient land by the traditional rule and redistributes some of the
weight to the easement holder, thus equalizing the relative position of both
parties.
On balance, the new rule, if applied evenly and cautiously, generates the
maximum utility for all parties. If Missouri continues on this course, the new
rule should be applied in cases where the servient land owner has acted
reasonably and has attempted to leave the easement holder in approximately
the same position in which he or she was found. The idea is consistent with
157. See The Right of Owners, supra note 4, at 1701. For a discussion of other
forces that may be at work, see supra note 143.
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
159. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 163-72. These remedies include damages,
injunction, or a combination of both.
161. For a discussion of the possible remedies in a case of unreasonable
relocation, see infra text accompanying notes 163-72.
[Vol. 611060
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other property concepts that encourage maximum efficiency and improvement
while keeping a watchful eye on property rights.62
C. Synthesizing the Old and New: What to Do
When a Relocation is Unreasonable
Under the new approach, there are three possible outcomes in any
relocation case. First, a court could find a relocation to be completely
reasonable under the Restatement factors. Second, a court could find that the
relocation was more reasonable than unreasonable and award damages to bring
the relocation fully into compliance. 6 In situations like Umphres where the
reasonableness factors tip the balance in favor of the relocation, the only
remedy provided under the new rule is damages to bring the new easement
fully into compliance with the factors that constitute reasonableness."
Finally, a relocation could be generally unreasonable.'
The Restatement is clear on the rule regarding reasonable relocations, and
Umphres suggests the logical result in cases of a primarily reasonable
relocation. The question remains as to what a court will do when faced with
a case of unreasonable relocation based upon the factors set out in section
4.8.166 Although not directly addressing the point, the Restatement may be
hinting at an answer in Illustration Five.' 67 In that illustration, 0, the
servient land owner, relocates an easement appurtenant for a roadway.'68
The new location passes through swampy ground that is subject to
flooding. 69  Because of the unreasonableness of this relocation, the
Restatement concludes that 0 is not entitled to relocate without the consent of
162. Adverse possession law and prescriptive easement law can be viewed as
examples of this concept. Both of these doctrines recognize that property rights must
yield at some point to efficiency. In adverse possession, the inattentive owner loses
land to another that has put it to use. With covenants, changes in conditions that
destroy the initial utility of the covenant can wipe it out.
163. Umphres falls into this category. The Restatement does not specifically
provide for the remedy awarded here, but such an award would be the logical
implication of the rule.
164. Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enterprises, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). The court implied, in ruling on sufficiency of the damage award, that the
money represented the amount needed to put the new easement in a state of repair
comparable to the old location.
165. Umphres does not address this problem.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.8 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1994).
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the owner of the dominant estate. 7 ' This result echoes the traditional rule
against unilateral relocation. This suggests that the drafters of the Restatement
believe that the new rule only applies when a relocation is reasonable. This
illustration implies that the old rule remains in effect in cases where the
relocation is deemed unreasonable by a court. The courts must then determine
what remedy should be awarded.'
Logically, there are three avenues a court could choose in remedying an
unreasonable relocation. First, a court could issue an injunction requiring the
servient land holder to restore the easement to its former location and pay
damages caused to the easement holder due to the trespass. Second, the court
could strike a middle ground and issue an injunction requiring relocation to
some part of the servient estate that the court finds to be reasonable under the
Restatement factors. Third, the court could award damages equal to the loss
in value to the dominant estate due to the relocation, leaving the easement in
the unreasonable location chosen by the servient land holder. Based upon the
Restatement, it is unclear which method courts might favor.
Missouri cases clearly indicate that its courts favor the first approach.
The traditional line of cases routinely grant injunctive relief to remedy
interference with an easement. While not directly addressing the issue,
Missouri's analysis seems to parallel the Restatement's. In Missouri, then, a
servient land owner must face the risk that his or her unilateral relocation will
be deemed unreasonable by a court and, thus, face an injunction under
traditional relocation principles. While the courts have not announced that the
traditional rule will be followed in cases of unreasonable relocation, in effect,
this has been the result. A more coherent approach, however, might be to
follow the second alternative. Since the new rule focuses on increasing utility
and fairness, it might be best for the court to settle on an appropriate location
for the easement, thus insuring compliance with the Restatement
reasonableness factors and preventing future conflict.
D. Possible Directions for the Future
In addressing the relocation issue in the future, Missouri courts should
consider abandoning the "balance of the equities" language and should address
the issues in more direct terms. Missouri's reasonableness analysis has
evolved out of this equitable doctrine, but the equitable terminology has
170. Id.
171. But note that even if a relocation is unreasonable, a dominant estate holder
may lose his rights to complain by reverse prescription. Cf. McCarty v. Walton, 27
Cal. Rptr. 792, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (noting that when a dominant estate holder
wrongfully relocates an easement it may ripen into a new easement by prescription).
172. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
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outstripped its usefulness in easement law, and continued use can only lead to
confusion in the future in both equity and property law.
Umphres illustrates the pitfalls of this confusion. While Mayer acted in
defiance of the Umphres' rights and in the face of court action, the court
apparently ignored this, stating only that equitable considerations should be
flexible.' One can hardly imagine what type of action would justify an
injunction if this type of intentional conduct does not. Through the lens of the
Restatement, however, it is clear that the Umphres court was more concerned
with the reasonableness of the relocation than it was with actually "balancing
the equities." While balancing of the equities implies a host of considerations,
from the good faith of the parties to the reasonableness of the new location,
in reality the courts are looking almost entirely at the reasonableness of the
new location. Should the courts continue to speak of relocation in these
terms, the evolution of a valuable new rule could be unintentionally derailed
by other equitable doctrines. The other factors traditionally used in balancing
the equities could become more prominent and perhaps sidetrack a court faced
with a relocation question. In addition, the language of the easement cases
will surely begin to be cited in injunction cases, outside the context for which
the new rule was created. In the end, Missouri courts run the risk of
practitioners confusing two distinct areas of law, possibly misleading and
confusing courts as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Missouri, over the past fifty years, has slowly shifted toward the modem
rule on relocation of easements. While paying lip service to the strict
protection of easements, the courts, through equitable doctrines, have
fashioned remedial rules that force a different practical result, focusing on the
reasonableness of the relocation. With the impending release of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property, Missouri stands poised to
distinguish itself by recognizing and more fully examining its stance on the
servient land owner's right to relocate an easement. While the traditional rule
has its own advantages, the modern approach offers a more efficient and just
alternative for all parties. If Umphres gives any indication of things to come,
Missouri should be one of the first among a handful of progressive states to
embrace the new rule. Only time will tell if Missouri courts will have the
conviction to recognize and embrace the progressive rule that they have
created.
DOUGLAS B. HARRIS
173. Umphres, 889 S.W.2d at 91.
19961 1063
25
Harris: Harris: Balancing the Equities:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/7
